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Michael Trebilcock" and Multi-Disciplinary Professional
Lilla Csorgo" Practices: A Consumer Welfare
Perspective
Multi-disciplinary professional practices (MDPs) involving lawyers, accountants
and otherprofessionals, have been the subject of considerable industrystudyand
controversy in Canada and abroad. In this article, the authors evaluate the
advantages and disadvantages of MDPs strictly from a consumer welfare
perspective. They argue that, although MDP critics' concerns surrounding such
issues as solicitor-client privilege, independence, conflicts of interest, and unau-
thorized practice are valid, they are often overstated and are, in many cases,
encountered even today by professionals outside the MDP context. The advan-
tages to consumers of permitting the evolution of such practices would, in any
event, significantly outweigh such disadvantages. The authors'analysis provides
the background for their specific proposals to facilitate the creation and prolifera-
tion of fully-integrated MDPs and an appropriate regulatory framework for such
firms emphasizing inter-professional cooperation rather than competition and
including inter-professional coordination committees with consumer representa-
tion.
L'6tablissement de cabinets pluridsiciplinaires r6unissant sous un m~me toit
avocats, comptables de m~me que d'autres professionnels a suscit6 de
nombreuses etudes et fait couler beaucoup d'encre au Canada etA I'6tranger.
Dans cet article, les auteurs 6valuent les avantages et les inconvenients des
cabinets pluridisciplinaires strictement du point de vue du consommateur. Bien
que les critiques aient raison jusqu'a un certain point de soulever d'6ventuels
problumes lids au secret professionnel, A l'ind6pendance, auxconflits d'int6r~t et
A la pratique non autorisee de la profession, l'ampleur du probleme tend i 6tre
exag6re. Du reste, les professionnels oeuvrant A 'ext6rieur du cadre des
pratiques pluridisciplinaires n'6chappent pas pour autant aces problemes. En
d6finitive, ces inconv6nients sont n6gligeables par rapport aux avantages pour
le consommateur. Au terme de leur analyse, les auteurs proposent des modeles
pr6cis pour 1'6tablissement et la prolif6ration des cabinets pluridisciplinaires
pleinement integr6s de concert avec le cadre r6glementaire appropri6. Ces
cabinets miseraient sur ia collaboration entre les diverses disciplines
professionnellesplut6tque la rivalit etseraientdotds de comit6s de coordination
interprofessionnelle oui les consommateurs seraient repr6sent6s.
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Introduction1
Multi-Disciplinary Professional Practices (MDPs) involving lawyers,
accountants, and other professionals have emerged as a major issue of
controversy, particularly in the legal and accounting professions, and in
recent years have been the focus of studies in Canada by the Inter-
Provincial Chartered Accounting Task Force on the Multi-Disciplinary
Activities of Members Engaged in Public Practice (1995), the Law
Society of Upper Canada's Task Forces on Multi-Disciplinary Practice
(1998 & 2000), the Barreau du Qu6bec (1999), the Canadian Bar
Association (1999), and the Canadian Federation of Law Societies
(1999). Beyond Canada, the issue has attracted study by the International
Bar Association, the American Bar Association, the U.S. State Bar
Associations, the Law Society of England and Wales, English and
Scottish Royal Commissions, and governing bodies of the legal profes-
sion in Europe, Australia and New Zealand. 2 The recommendations of
these bodies diverge in both perspective and detail in many respects,
reflecting a serious lack of consensus in the legal profession on the role
and regulation of MDPs. The potential domain of MDPs extends to many
other contexts: in the family law context, family lawyers, social workers,
and financial advisers; in the personal and institutional wealth manage-
ment field, lawyers, accountants, and financial advisers; in the antitrust
and regulatory context, lawyers and economists; in the small and medium
sized business context, lawyers, accountants, and business consultants; in
the commercial real estate and infrastructure development context,
lawyers, urban planners, engineers, and financial consultants.'
1. This paper is based on a larger study undertaken by the authors and Charles River
Associates for the "Big Five" professional service firms in Canada in 1998 and 1999.
2. See Kent Roach & Edward Iacobucci, "Multi-Disciplinary Practices and Partnerships:
Prospects, Problems and Policy Options" (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 37 [hereinafter "Multi-
Disciplinary Practices (2000)"].
3. For a discussion of "socialjustice collaboratives" involving legal and other services for low
and moderate income clients in contexts such as at-risk families with children, domestic
violence, and community economic development (such as low-income housing), see Louise
G. Trubeck & Jennifer J. Farnham, "Social Justice Collaboratives: Multidisciplinary Practices
for People" (2000) 7 Clinical L. Rev. 227.
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This paper focuses principally on the current controversy between
lawyers and accountants and related professionals. Currently, a number
of regulatory constraints maintained by professional bodies in these two
professions constrain the formation and operation of such practices. For
example, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario maintains a
rule that disqualifies a firm from holding itself out as a firm of chartered
accountants unless all the partners in the firm are chartered accountants.
The Inter-Provincial Chartered Accounting Task Force on the Multi-
Disciplinary Activities of Members Engaged in Public Practice has
recommended that public practice firms that perform third-party reliance
services or hold themselves out as chartered accountants must be under
the direct control of Canadian chartered accountants. The Law Society of
Upper Canada, in turn, (like other provincial law societies throughout
Canada) maintains a number of professional rules of conduct that
substantially constrain the formation and operation of MDPs between
lawyers and non-lawyer professionals. The rule that most directly im-
pacts MDPs is Rule 9 of the Professional Rules of Conduct which
provides that lawyers may not directly or indirectly share fees with non-
lawyers who bring or refer business to them. Other rules relating to
unauthorized practice, permissible firm names, advertising and solicita-
tion, confidentiality, solicitor and client privilege, conflicts of interest,
and lawyers' indemnity insurance and trust funds also impede the
formation and operation of MDPs involving lawyers and non-lawyer
professionals in various ways.
The premise of this paper is that a principled evaluation of the
advantages and disadvantages of MDPs and appropriate frameworks for
regulating them should adopt a rigorous and single-minded consumer
welfare perspective. Delegated self-regulation of the professions can
only be justified in public interest terms. Its function is not to parcel up
various monopoly privileges on particular professional domains in order
to advance the economic self-interest of one or another professional
group. Adopting this consumer welfare perspective, in Part I of this study
we outline potential efficiency gains for consumers of professional
services from MDPs. In Part II, we evaluate the potential disadvantages
to consumers of professional services from MDPs within a market or
contracting failure framework. In Part III, we evaluate various models for
the regulation of MDPs involving lawyers, accountants, and other profes-
sionals with a view to identifying models that maximize the advantages
and minimize the disadvantages of such firms to relevant segments of
consumers of professional services. We argue for permitting and indeed
facilitating fully integrated MDPs, with inter-professional coordination
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committees that include representatives of demand-side interests consti-
tuted to resolve issues of conflicting regulatory requirements.
I. The Economics Of Integrated Professional Service Provision
The demand for MDPs relative to more specialized professional firms is
likely to depend upon the type of consumer and the type of transaction for
which the consumer requires assistance. Professional services for some
transactions for certain types of consumers are more efficiently provided
by MDPs, while others are more efficiently provided by more specialized
firms. The economic theory of the firm provides some guidance as to why
this is the case by analyzing the benefits and costs of integration.
The theory of the firm attempts to explain why some private sector
activities are organized within firms through vertical or horizontal
integration of complementary functions, while other activities are orga-
nized through external contracting in the market. 4 The key consideration
is the relative cost of the alternative arrangements. For example, General
Motors, as a demander of tires for its vehicles, may purchase them from
an independent tire-manufacturing company or it may create its own tire-
manufacturing division. In fact, firms such as General Motors exhibit a
whole spectrum of methods of organizing inputs necessary to the produc-
tion of its final goods. At one extreme, General Motors may decide to
produce everything in-house, even to the point of producing raw inputs.
In this case, it would be a fully vertically-integrated firm. Alternatively,
General Motors may decide to subcontract the production of all the inputs
of vehicle production, including assembly, so that General Motors itself
would merely be a coordinator of production and a reseller.
This is similarly the case for users of professional services. A large
company, such as Microsoft, in producing business plans, marketing
strategies and other inputs for which law, accounting, consulting and
other expertise may be necessary, may choose to employ full-time staff
to provide the whole gamut of these services. It is rare, however, to
observe a firm characterized by such full vertical integration. One reason
is limited demand. A firm's demand for such a variety of expertise may
be episodic and may not warrant maintenance of full-time in-house
expertise. The problem of coordinating all the different aspects of
production, without the benefit of market signals with respect to value
4. For a review of literature on the theory of the firm, see Paul Milgrom & John Roberts,
Economics, Organization, and Management (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1992) c.
2. Recent law and economics scholarship that views the firm as "a nexus of contracts" between
various stakeholders in the firm suggests that the distinction between integration by ownership
and integration by contract is really a distinction between various modes of internal and
external contracting. See e.g. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic
Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991).
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and scarcity of inputs, may also prove inefficient. Microsoft may,
however, require the expertise of some professionals, such as accoun-
tants, with sufficient frequency that it may be more economical to employ
dedicated accountants who are devoted full-time to Microsoft's interests.
The balance that a company like Microsoft strikes between these two
models of obtaining professional services depends, in part, on the cost of
obtaining these services from outside the firm and the relative benefits
Microsoft derives from outside services. The outcome of such a cost-
benefit analysis will not only depend on the client, service and transaction
in question, but also on the type of professional service firm providing it.
Some services may be more efficiently provided by an MDP through
horizontal integration of complementary inputs while other services may
be more efficiently provided by more specialized firms. Just as both the
legal and accounting/consulting professions have witnessed the growth
of large full-service domestic and multinational firms, through horizontal
integration, so simultaneously both professions have witnessed the
proliferation of small, specialized (or boutique) firms. This broadly
tracks experience in many other sectors of the economy where one
observes simultaneously increased concentration of firms in some seg-
ments of these markets and the proliferation of start-ups and small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in other segments of these markets.
(SMEs account for much of the job creation in many industrialized
economies). Hence, MDPs are not a portent of a more general trend to
"monopoly capitalism" in the modem economy.
Section 1 below describes the cost savings that consumers may be able
to realize by dealing with a professional services firm that is able to offer
a wide spectrum of services. Section 2 describes the reduced costs of
production from which a firm may benefit by offering a wide spectrum
of services. It further indicates how consumers may also benefit from
these reduced production costs through reduced prices and enhanced
quality. Section 3 discusses the benefits of integration that may be lost
should legal services only be offered through law firms that are affiliated
with accounting firms, but where the firms do not share revenues.
1. Reduced Consumption-Related Costs
A consumer may incur reduced consumption-related costs when dealing
with a firm, such as an MDP, that is able to offer a number of services and
specialists in one location. This is most evident in the case of grocery
supermarkets or department stores offering a wide range of goods and
services, although typically in competition with specialized or boutique
retail stores that operate in sub-segments of the market. The cost savings
from which a consumer may benefit include a reduction in the following
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costs: search, contracting, coordination, monitoring, and information
costs.' These benefits are commonly referred to as the virtues of one-stop
shopping. There are fixed costs associated with search, verification, and
monitoring if the user contracts across several non-integrated suppliers of
complementary services. These costs will be reduced if these services are
provided by one horizontally-integrated firm. The buyer can then either
monitor randomly across the services and impute the verified quality to
the entire integrated firm and/or rely on substantial brand name capital
that would be at risk if the integrated firm were to fail to deliver on its
promised quality. If buyers use these services only infrequently then they
are more likely to resort to an integrated provider. Thus if a client firm
engages only periodically in activities that require professional services,
the client firm may wish to use a more fully integrated provider of those
services. This is likely to be particularly true of small and medium sized
enterprises (SMEs) seeking additional capital to finance expansion or to
enter new markets where a combination of corporate law, financial, and
business consulting services may be required. If the client firm is a
frequent purchaser of these services, or alternatively is a highly sophis-
ticated and specialized consumer of professional services, it may pay that
client to assemble a team independently and to incur the enhanced search,
monitoring, and coordination costs. For instance, a firm that engages in
many mergers may choose to divide up the finance, tax, and competition
aspects of an individual acquisition across different professional firms
(integration or coordination by contract rather than ownership).
a. Search Costs
Suppose a corporate consumer of professional services were interested in
a major merger with a rival affecting a number of geographic markets.
Such a transaction would require the consumer to obtain the expertise of
specialists in a variety of areas - law, finance, tax, accounting, and so
forth. The consumer would have to search for experts in each of these
service areas and possibly in a variety of geographic locations. The costs
of this search would likely increase if the consumer has not previously
had dealings with professional firms in all these service areas in all the
geographic areas in question. The consumer would then have to incur the
additional cost of obtaining information on the quality of a number of
firms in a number of areas before an informed decision could be made.
Thus, the search process is likely to be time-consuming, resulting in the
additional cost of delaying the merger. Despite the high search costs,
5. See Phillip Nelson, "Information and Consumer Behavior" (1970) 78 J. Pol. Econ. 311, for
a discussion of factors affecting consumer search costs.
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however, given no other alternatives, it may be in the consumer's best
interest to incur them because the cost of choosing an inappropriate or
inferior firm in one service area or one geographic market could have
consequences for the entire transaction. Given these costs and risks, a
consumer may wish to reduce search costs by engaging an MDP that is
able to provide all these services in many or all of the geographic
locations.
The MDP could offer such a consumer the additional benefit of a signal
of quality. An MDP would be unlikely to invest in the assembly and
promotion of a full gamut of specialized professional services if it did not
expect a return on its investment.6 In order better to assure a return, the
MDP would benefit from providing a certain quality of service which is
consistent with the size and specificity of its investment. Observing this
signal would further reduce the consumer's need to undertake the cost of
attempting to discern quality. The issue of search costs is likely to be
particularly relevant to smaller firms with little experience outside their
local market seeking to grow nationally and internationally.
Should the consumer be well-informed with respect to the type and
quality of services offered by a variety of firms in the relevant countries
so that her search costs are low or negligible, the consumer may wish to
by-pass an MDP in favour of a combination of specialized firms. Search
costs tend to be consumer-specific. The more complex and geographi-
cally dispersed a transaction, the higher search costs are likely to be.
b. Contracting Costs
If a consumer chooses to complete the merger process using the services
of a variety of professional firms, she will have to contract with each one.
This increases costs not only because of the time required and the cost of
writing each contract, but also because of the cost of specifying the tasks
that each firm must perform in order to avoid duplication or omitted tasks.
The contracting costs are also likely to be further increased if the
transaction is unique or complex.' Consumer and producer requirements
are less likely to be satisfied through standardized contracts. If an MDP
were to be available, the consumer may choose not to incur costs of
contracting with a large number of firms and only choose to contract with
one. Furthermore, contracting for separate responsibilities is often not
possible because it is not known ex ante what types of information are
6. See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, "Prices and Advertising Signals of Product Quality"
(1986) 94 J. Pol. Econ. 796.
7. For further discussion of the effects of information costs on economic structures, see Armen
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization"
(1972) 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777.
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needed or the informational requirements that would follow from infor-
mation discovered in initial stages of investigation. Integration of infor-
mation inputs into a single enterprise allows the efficient coordination of
related inputs.
c. Coordination Costs
Once having entered into a series of contracts with separate firms to
perform various parts of the merger process, the consumer must coordi-
nate these tasks. Either the client or a designated service firm can perform
this coordination role. In either case, it may involve a variety of firms that
are normally rivals or otherwise do not have established lines and means
of communication. As a result, the consumer will have to provide similar
information to some or all of the service firms she has hired, since much
of the same information will be relevant to the different service firms. For
instance, business consultants, accountants or investment bankers in
determining the cost savings of a merger would likely be interested in
information similar to that required by economists and lawyers determin-
ing, for anti-trust purposes, whether the merger results in a substantial
lessening of competition or an increase in efficiency. The net result is that
the cost to the consumer of dealing with a variety of firms may be greater
than if the consumer had dealt with just one. Again this will depend upon
the individual consumer and her preferences and requirements.
If an MDP were available to a consumer, the consumer would be able
to weigh the benefits of these reduced transaction costs against any cost
she may incur from conducting the transaction through an MDP. For
instance, a consumer may be interested in a specific type of highly
specialized expertise that an MDP has not been able to assemble in its
repertoire of services, or is not able to provide at a sufficiently high level
of quality. It is this variety in consumer needs and preferences which
explains the simultaneous emergence of large full-line professional
service firms and highly specialized boutique firms. The costs to the
consumer of dealing with the MDP may also include the possible costs
and risks to solicitor-client privilege, conflicts of interest and indepen-
dence discussed in Part II.
2. Reduced Production-Related Costs
The benefits that the producer of professional services may realize from
moving a function in-house (through horizontal or vertical integration)
rather than purchasing it through contracts on the open market or leaving
it to his customer to purchase elsewhere include benefits specific to the
technology of production - economies of scale and scope. The benefits
may also include a reduction of transaction costs specific to the producer.
These reduced production and transaction costs may in turn translate into
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lower costs to consumers by further reducing consumers' transaction
costs, by lowering the price paid by consumers, or by increasing the
quality and variety of services made available to them. Apart from these
economic advantages to producers of professional services from horizon-
tal and vertical integration, it is also arguable that constitutional values
associated with freedom of association (section 2(d) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms) are engaged.8
a. Economies of Scope
Economies of scope arise when the total cost of producing a group of
products or services is less when those products are produced by a single
firm than when the same volume of those products or services are
produced by a set of independent firms. For instance, in the case of an
MDP in our merger example, it may be cheaper to produce the final
product - the requirements of the merger - in one location. An MDP, for
instance, may facilitate the coordination and collaboration between a tax
accountant and a tax lawyer.9 This is a cost-saving not only to the
producer, but also possibly to the consumer who, in the absence of an
MDP, may have had to incur some of the costs of coordination herself.
Further exemplifying economies of scope, "[l]awyers and non-lawyers
working together may also complement each other by bringing different
problem-solving techniques to bear on an issue. As professionals become
more specialized in order to satisfy complex client needs, a collaboration
of professionals is more likely to result in optimal problem-solving
approaches."' 0 The consumer would benefit from the resulting increase
in quality of service.
b. Economies of Scale
Economies of scale arise when the average cost of producing a good
decreases with increased production of the good. Conjecturing that
MDPs will result in economies of scale assumes that the introduction of
an MDP will result in an increase in firm demand. This assumption is not
unrealistic since product diversification is normally undertaken in order
to increase the combined demand for a firm's services and reduce its
dependency on any one class of product or service. Such an increase in
demand may be more likely in geographic markets where the market is
sufficiently small so that offering a limited set of services does not allow
8. See Jamie Cameron, "Back to Fundamentals: Multi-Disciplinary Partnerships and Free-
dom of Association under Section 2(d) of the Charter" (2000) 50 U.T.L.J. 261.
9. Kent Roach & Edward lacobucci, "Multi-Disciplinary Partnerships: A Review of the
Literature" (1998) Working Paper prepared for the Law Society of Upper Canada's Working
GrouO on Multi-Disciplinary Partnerships at 59.
10. Ibid. at 59.
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for growth opportunities and thus does not allow scale economies to be
achieved. An MDP may allow for the following: the employment of
highly specialized personnel; technological investments that would oth-
erwise be too costly; and an increase in production that would otherwise
not be possible due to limitations in growth potential when product or
service offerings are restricted.
With the increase in firm demand that may accompany an MDP service
offering, a firm may be able to justify the hiring of more specialized
people. Since the skills of these people are particular to a more limited set
of tasks, they would likely be able to complete that task more efficiently
and competently than someone whose expertise only touches upon the
area. For instance, having tax accountants and tax lawyers or corporate
lawyers and financial analysts in-house may be complementary in that
they enhance each other's productivity. Clearly, the MDP would not hire
a specialized tax or corporate lawyer unless an increase in MDP demand
justified it, allowing both the lawyer and the accountant or business
consultant to concentrate on their areas of comparative advantage. Thus,
the MDP may lead to an increase in firm demand, which would permit the
employment of more specialized personnel, allowing for a reallocation of
tasks, resulting in a decrease in average costs and an increase in quality.
A reallocation of tasks within an MDP may, in some cases, translate
into a substitution away from the demand for more traditional law firms
in favour of MDPs and the non-lawyers employed there, with the net
result that the overall demand for legal services may decrease. This is
likely to be counter-balanced by several factors. First, the ability to
substitute across disciplines is likely to be limited given the "narrow areas
in which the skills of particular professions and occupations overlap in
some substantial way."' I Some products offered by law firms and other
professional services firms are entirely distinct or without
complementarities. For instance, an accounting firm providing a valua-
tion of physical assets and a law firm providing advice regarding a
particular lawsuit may use informational inputs that are completely
distinct. Consequently, as there is little by way of efficiencies to be gained
by offering these products jointly, one would expect these types of
services to continue to be offered by specialized firms. Second, MDPs
"may result in the creation of new services, either through advances in
quality or through the introduction of wholly original forms of service."' 12
Where these lead to enhancements in the productivity of lawyers in an
11. John Quinn, "Multidisciplinary Services: Organizational Innovation in Professional
Service Markets" (1978) Working Paper #7, prepared for The Professional Organizations
Committee at 50.
12. Ibid. at 7.
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MDP context, e.g. through combining of complementary skills, this is
likely to lead to an increase rather than a decrease in the demand for
lawyers.
The increase in demand accompanying an MDP may also allow for
investment in technologies that could not otherwise be justified, or,
absent the MDP, would have resulted in two parties duplicating the
investments. A major area of investment required in order to respond to
business client needs is information technology, such as databases
containing information on fins, industries, and markets that permit rapid
development of firm and industry profiles, allowing all branches of a
professional services firm consistently, accurately and quickly to address
client needs. Being able to offer this service benefits clients by providing
them with a higher quality service. Investments in such technologies,
however, are costly and a firm that is small and limited in its growth
potential by the services that it is able to offer may find the cost
prohibitive. If, however, the same firm is able to diversify its product
offerings, the resulting increase in demand may render the investment
feasible. Thus, markets that would otherwise not be served by such a
product, may now be served. Alternatively, even if a firm is able to make
such an investment, an increase in demand would enlarge the client base
over which the fixed costs of the investment are spread. This type of
decrease in average costs is equally true for more traditional fixed costs
of production such as overhead. Some geographic markets may be so
small that a professional services firm or branch location cannot be
justified absent the ability to offer a full spectrum of services.
c. Potential Benefits to Consumers
Consumers may benefit directly from the enhanced production econo-
mies through the increase in quality of service that MDPs can provide -
for instance, the greater specialized skill sets of the professional person-
nel and improved technological capabilities. 3 Consumers may also
benefit by being served in markets in which they had previously not been
served. Consumers may also benefit from the lower costs of production.
In a competitive market, greater production efficiencies translate into
lower prices as competitors bid prices down towards the new, lower costs.
As an MDP does not in itself involve a decrease in the number of
13. The Report by the American Bar Association's Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice notes that there was "strong testimony from business clients, representatives of
consumers groups, and ABA entities that amending the Model Rules to permit fee sharing and
partnerships and other association with a nonlawyer is in the best interests of the public."
(American Bar Association Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice Report to the House of
Delegates, August, 1999, Appendix C, at 8.)
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professional services firms competing for business but rather entails an
extension of product offerings, the introduction of these services is more
likely to increase rather than decrease the competitiveness of the market.
d. Limits on Alternative Means of Achieving Economies
It is possible that some of the economies associated with MDPs could be
achieved by other means. For instance, an accounting firm and a law firm
may decide to invest jointly in a database, the sharing of which would be
established through a long-term contract. While such a system of organi-
zation is possible, there are a number of factors that may make such a
solution less attractive than keeping such a function strictly in-house.
First, the contract is likely to be cumbersome and incomplete, particularly
given the uncertainty of the demand and use for such a database. All
possible contingencies could not possibly be contracted for so that
contracting would become more a question of specifying rights, obliga-
tions and procedures rather than actual performance standards. Such a
situation is likely to be further exacerbated if an asset-specific investment
is required by either party. 4 For instance, the database may require one
firm, Firm A, to invest in a computer system that has a lower value to Firm
A absent the partnership. Once this commitment is made, the partner to
the agreement, Firm B, may have an incentive to behave opportunisti-
cally, demanding, for instance, better contractual terms. Consequently,
Firm A would end up with lower than anticipated returns or, should the
joint effort to produce the database fail as a result of opportunism, a costly
investment that Firm A would not otherwise have made. 5
Even if the joint investment in the database were successfully con-
tracted and produced, difficulties may arise due to an imperfect ability to
measure output and use. For instance, one party to the investment may
argue that the usage costs charged to it are too high because of inefficient
maintenance of the database by the other party. Many of these transaction
costs could be avoided or reduced were these transactions to be internal-
ized within a firm rather than through a contracting process. With single
ownership, the incentive for opportunistic behaviour would be reduced or
eliminated. This again would lower the cost of producing the product,
which would benefit final consumers.
14. See Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 4 at 32.
15. For further discussion of asset specificity see Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford &
Armen A. Alchian, "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contract-
ing Process" (1978) 21 J.L. & Econ. 297.
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e. Limits on Economies of Scale and Scope
There are limits to the extent to which a firm may find it beneficial to
internalize certain functions. There are limits to economies of scale and
scope and some firms may simply become so big that the returns to scale
are negative. This is evident from the decline in conglomerate business
firms which faced span of effective control problems. There are real
advantages to managers being well-acquainted with the businesses they
run, and there is evidence that less diversified firms often perform
better. 16
3. Efficient Incentive Structures: MDPs vs. Affiliated Law Firms
We have outlined a variety of factors that suggest that there can be a
number of advantages associated with having a number of professional
services offered by one firm. Some of the advantages of scale and scope
are likely to be lost if professional service firms were only allowed to
provide legal services through a separate firm, such as an affiliated law
firm, since the efficiencies largely rely upon the services being produced
in one organization. Furthermore, an affiliated law firm structure does not
allow for revenue-sharing across firms. Without a revenue-sharing ar-
rangement, in order to benefit from the arrangement the affiliated law
firm and the professional services firm would have to rely on the other
reciprocating should one refer work to the other. Should one firm fail to
reciprocate with a similar volume or value of referrals, there would be
little incentive to continue with such referrals and indeed incentives
would exist to "hoard" clients, even though referrals may be more
efficient from the client's perspective. Should the reciprocal arrangement
fail, any benefits to integration that remain in the affiliated law firm
arrangement would be completely lost.
Furthermore, a client's monitoring of quality may prove to be more
difficult with respect to an affiliated law firm structure compared to an
MDP. When a client is unable to distinguish the quality of the legal advice
from the quality of the accounting advice contained in a product jointly
produced by both entities, the incentives to provide a quality product are
distorted. Each firm bears only part of the cost in reputation of any
reduction in quality. Should a client complain with respect to the joint
product, each firm's position may be to blame the other for the product's
shortcomings. This "reputational externality" is internalized with the
provision of the product by a single organization. An MDP can put in
16. See for example, Birger Wernerfelt & Cynthia A. Montgomery, "Tobin's q and the
Importance of Focus in Firm Performance" (1988) 78:1 Am. Econ. Rev. 246; and, Frank
Lichtenberg, "Industrial De-Diversification and Its Consequences for Productivity", National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 3231 (January 1991).
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place incentives for professional personnel to produce quality products,
in addition to being better able to monitor quality of output.
II. Objections To Multi-Disciplinary Practices
1. Framework of Analysis
In this section of our study, we both identify and evaluate the principal
objections to, or concerns that have been raised by, MDPs that include the
provision of legal services as part of a broader array of professional
services. In our view, the paramount perspective in evaluating these
objections or concerns should be that of purchasers of professional
services (i.e. clients). That is to say, the regulation of the professions must
be grounded in a public interest justification that, in the nature of things,
will overwhelmingly focus on the need to protect consumers of profes-
sional services against service deficiencies or ethical improprieties that
are likely to arise in the absence of regulation. This consumer welfare
perspective stands in sharp contrast to a producer welfare perspective
that, in its most extreme form, is likely to view the rationale for
professional regulation in large part as economic protectionism. From
this latter perspective, issues relating to the regulation of MDPs quickly
become reduced to turf wars between lawyers, accountants, and other
professionals contending for different divisions of the rents from alterna-
tive delineations of professional monopolies. We believe that it is self-
evident that the only principled justification for professional regulation
is a consumer welfare perspective. The adoption of such a perspective
enables us to evaluate both the advantages and disadvantages of MDPs
within a single, consistent framework.
Within this framework, the principal justification for professional
regulation is what economists refer to as market or contracting failures
that are likely to arise in the absence of regulation. In the professional
service context, these market failures are likely to fall into two broad
categories: first, information asymmetries, and second, externalities. 7
With respect to information asymmetries, the efficient provision of
many professional services involves the deployment of complex bodies
of technical knowledge and expertise that are only likely to be acquired
through protracted periods of formal and on-the-job professional training
and experience. Comparable levels of expertise will rarely be possessed
by consumers of professional services (in which event they should
17. Professional Organization Committee, Ontario Ministry of the Attorney-General, Pro-
fessional Regulation (Staff Study) by Michael Trebilcock, Carolyn Tuohy & Alan Wolfson
(1979) c. 3.
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* consider switching sides in the market place). This informational imbal-
ance or asymmetry both explains the need for many consumers to
purchase specialized professional services and also their vulnerability in
engaging in such transactions. Consumers may be unaware of the precise
technical issues that their circumstances require to be addressed; they
may be unaware of which professional service providers are best equipped
to provide assistance in resolving these issues; and they may have limited
ability to monitor the quality, appropriateness, cost and efficacy of
services once rendered. That is to say, in economists' terms, professional
services are often "credence" or "experience" goods, rather than "search"
goods."5 The severity of these information failures is likely to differ
widely from one professional context to the other. For example, with
respect to the provision of legal services, large multi-national corporations
with recurrent needs for highly specialized professional services and in-
house counsel and a supporting legal department to act as purchasing
agents when external legal services are required may face modest
informational barriers that are no more severe than those that they face in
a host of other professional and technical contexts where they are
accustomed to purchasing services from sources external to the corpora-
tion and where regulation is often minimal or non-existent (e.g. strategic
planning, marketing expertise, management consulting, information
technology services). On the other hand, household consumers purchas-
ing even relatively routine legal services in connection with, for example,
family law, estate planning, tax, or civil litigation matters on a relatively
episodic basis are likely to face much more severe information problems.
Thus, a combination of both the technical complexity of the service in
question and the degree of sophistication and discernment of the consum-
ers of that service provides the basis for this rationale for regulation.
The second major market or contracting failure rationale for profes-
sional regulation relates to externalities. With respect to some profes-
sional services, even if the direct purchasers of these services are
sophisticated and discerning, the provision of professional services may
have negative third-party effects which, in the absence of regulation, both
service providers and service consumers may have inadequate incentives
to internalize. For example, purchasers of engineering services, even if
well informed, may assign too little weight to potentially negative effects
on third-parties of unsafe design and construction practices, in order to
minimize project costs. Similarly, while the management of corporations
18. See Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic
Change (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
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or other entities that are subject to statutory audit requirements typically
hire a firm's auditors, the principal purpose of a statutory audit is the
protection of shareholders in and lenders to firms subject to audit.
Regulation may thus be required to ensure that auditors are not exces-
sively deferential to incumbent management which have retained them
and insufficiently sensitive to the interests of potentially affected third-
parties. In some cases, of course, these third parties may be sufficiently
sophisticated and discerning that they can adopt effective self-precau-
tionary strategies. In other cases, potentially affected third parties may
either be unsophisticated or lack realistic self-precautionary options. In
our view, regulation of the quality, cost, and performance of professional
services, including various ethical rules pertaining to professional con-
duct, must find a justification within the market or contracting failure
framework sketched above in order to satisfy a public interest (or as we
would prefer to characterize it, consumer welfare) test.
In evaluating the strength of objections and concerns relating to MDPs,
ideally the analysis should proceed at both theoretical and empirical
levels. That is to say, at a theoretical level, one can develop various
tentative hypotheses as to the likely strength or otherwise of various
objections or concerns relating to MDPs within the market or contracting
failure framework sketched above, and then test these hypotheses against
empirical evidence (an exercise that is facilitated if there is a varied body
of comparative regulatory experience upon which to draw).
There are various ways in which these objections and concerns can be
taxonomized. The Working Group on Multi-Discipline Partnerships of
the Law Society of Upper Canada 9 identified three areas of primary
concern: (a) solicitor-client privilege; (b) independence; and (c) conflicts
of interest. In addition, several other issues characterized as "secondary
and largely surmountable" were identified, including (d) the impact of
lawyers' participation in MDPs on coverage and liability insurance
premiums under the lawyers' mandatory professional indemnity scheme;
(e) regulation of professional responsibility with respect to ethical
breaches by non-lawyer partners, including the unauthorized practice of
law by such partners; and (f) problems in the extension of rules relating
to the management of lawyers' trust funds to non-lawyer
partners.
19. Law Society of Upper Canada, The "Futures" Task Force, Final Report of the Working
Group on Multi-Discipline Partnerships - Report to Convocation (25 September, 1998),
[hereinafter Futures Report] at Appendix 10.
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Professors Kent Roach and Edward lacobucci in a background study
initially prepared for the Law Society of Upper Canada's Working Group
on Multi-Disciplinary Partnerships" identify the following three broad
problem areas and sub-issues within each of these areas.2 '
1. Governance Concerns
(i) Unauthorized Practice
(ii) Disciplinary Jurisdiction Over Non-Lawyers
(iii) Self-Regulation of the Legal Profession
(iv) Advertising and Solicitation
(v) Assessment of Fees
(vi) Trust Accounts
(vii) Custodianship and Practice Reviews
(viii) Insurance and Compensation Funds
(ix) Disbarred Persons
2. Independence Concerns
(i) The Independence of Legal Advice
(ii) Outside Interests and Ancillary Businesses
(iii) Fee Splitting
(iv) Steering
3. Confidentiality Concerns
(i) Confidentiality
(ii) Privilege
(iii) Conflict of Interest
In the following discussion, we confine our focus to what appear to be the
primary areas of concern, i.e. (a) solicitor-client privilege; (b) lawyers'
independence; (c) conflicts of interest; and (d) the unauthorized practice
of law.
2. Solicitor-Client Privilege
Communications between clients and their lawyers have historically
been accorded an extremely high degree of immunity from enforced
disclosure in subsequent civil and criminal proceedings under the doc-
trine of solicitor-client privilege. The rationale for this doctrine is that
without the immunity it provides, clients may be discouraged from fully
20. Subsequently published in revised form as "Multi-Disciplinary Practices (2000)", supra
note 2.
21. Ibid. at 15-36.
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confiding their legal secrets to their lawyers because of apprehensions
that their lawyers may be called as witnesses in subsequent legal proceed-
ings. However, without the ability of clients to confide fully in their legal
advisors, the latter would be severely hampered in discharging their role
as both advisors to and advocates of their clients in the adversarial
processes that characterize the administration of justice in most common
law jurisdictions. This privilege may be lost if a lawyer discloses
privileged information to third parties who are not lawyers. In the context
of MDPs, it is often argued that the very nature of these practices entails
information sharing between lawyers and non-lawyers, so that the risk of
loss of privilege is pervasive. While it has been established that the
privilege extends to non-legal personnel working under the supervision
of a lawyer (e.g. paralegal staff, secretarial staff, and articling students),
it is far from clear that the privilege would also extend to information
disclosed by lawyers to non-lawyer partners in an MDP. While the
privilege may extend to information disclosed by a lawyer to non-lawyer
professionals with a view to preparing material for litigation and may also
extend to information provided by clients to a non-lawyer professional
with a view to the latter in turn providing the information to a lawyer for
the preparation of a legal opinion, there is serious doubt that the privilege
would extend to cases where a lawyer has provided information to a non-
lawyer partner (e.g. an accountant) for the performance of purely ac-
counting functions, or where a client of a multi-disciplinary firm has
provided information to an accountant to perform purely accounting
functions unrelated to prospective litigation. 2
While the risks to solicitor-client privilege entailed in MDPs are
legitimate concerns, in our view they are easily and commonly over-
stated. If a client is involved in a complex transaction or dispute which
genuinely requires inputs from a number of different types of profession-
als, the client will have little choice but to disclose relevant information
to all of these professionals either directly or perhaps through the agency
of his or her lawyer. While it is common in such situations for lawyers or
their clients to obtain confidentiality agreements from other profession-
als involved in providing advice, confidentiality obligations are not
coterminous with the doctrine of solicitor-client privilege, and disclo-
sures made pursuant to such commitments may nevertheless be subject
to subsequent mandatory disclosure in legal proceedings. Put differently,
if a client's problem genuinely requires a multi-disciplinary approach to
its resolution, then no matter how the multi-disciplinary inputs are
22. See "Multi-Disciplinary Practices (2000)", supra note 2 at 28-34.
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organized and coordinated, solicitor-client privilege will be at risk
relative to a situation where the only professional inputs required are
legal. But, it must be emphasized, the source of this risk is the nature of
the client's problem, not the mode of organization employed to address
that problem. Moreover, it might reasonably be argued that in an MDP,
lawyers may be able to exert more influence with both clients and non-
lawyer professionals in exercising caution in making or requesting non-
privileged disclosures than when clients purchase these services from
separate service providers, many of whom may be unable to assert
privilege. Finally, in order to keep the value of solicitor-client privilege
to clients in perspective, it should be noted that beyond the right against
self-incrimination in criminal law, clients themselves are typically dis-
coverable in most civil litigation.
3. Legal Independence
Legal independence concerns about MDPs have several strands to them.
First, it is argued that a lawyer's obligation of undivided loyalty to his or
her client's interests is likely to be compromised in a multi-disciplinary
firm, given the professional and economic interdependencies entailed in
such a firm's structure. For example, it is argued that the professional and
economic interests of non-lawyer members of the firm in ensuring that a
transaction is consummated may lead them to bring pressures to bear on
lawyer members of the firm to compromise their advice to a client where
this advice might identify risks (e.g. tax, securities law, competition
policy, environmental law risks) in proceeding with the transaction.
Moreover, the economic interests of the lawyer in the firm may militate
in the same direction. Second, it is sometimes argued that the multi-
disciplinary form of practice is likely to create incentives for inappropri-
ate forms of "steering", where non-lawyer partners "steer" clients to their
lawyer partners or vice versa, because of economic interdependencies,
when the client's interests would be better served by securing the
professional services in issue from superior quality sources external to the
firm.
Again, while these concerns are not without substance, it is easy to
overstate their novelty and significance in the multi-disciplinary firm
context relative to other established forms of professional practice. For
example, in a large full service corporate/commercial law firm embracing
many specialities, an individual lawyer may be subject to the same
pressures from other partners to facilitate a transaction which in the
former's view raises certain legal or other risks for the client. Similarly,
there will be incentives for lawyers in large law firms to steer clients to
other members of the firm for other legal services when these services
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might be more competently provided by professionals outside the firm.
Indeed, "steering" within large law firms is a widely-endorsed contem-
porary marketing strategy, except that it is called "cross-selling".
4. Conflicts of Interest
Concerns that MDPs involving lawyers and other professionals exacer-
bate conflict of interest problems again have several strands. First, it is
argued that in large and professionally diverse multi-disciplinary firms,
conflicts of interest are inherently likely to become more pervasive.
Second, it is argued that some professions have different cultures and
traditions than other professions in relation to the regulation of conflicts
of interest and that lawyers, who are subject to stringent conflict of
interest rules in order to ensure uncompromising fidelity to individual
client's interests, are especially likely to find their commitment to these
ethical norms in jeopardy in MDPs with non-lawyer professionals. For
example, it is sometimes argued that accounting/consulting firms will
often audit and/or provide consulting services to more than one major
firm in the same industry, arguing that this often well serves their clients'
interests both individually and collectively by developing substantial
industry-specific expertise. Lawyers, however, may be concerned that
providing legal services to several major competitors in the same industry
may compromise their ability to serve any one of these firm's interests
effectively, particularly in the event of disputes between such clients.
Third, it is often argued that divergent legal and ethical duties of lawyers
and non-lawyer professionals may create insoluble dilemmas within
MDPs. For example, auditors who are subject to legal duties to third
parties may feel bound to disclose publicly information provided to them
by their corporate clients even though this may be adverse to the latters'
interests, while lawyers in the same firm possessed of this information
(e.g. information about contingent liabilities of the corporate client)
would feel duty bound not to disclose this information to third parties out
of concern for jeopardizing the client's interests. Indeed such information
may be subject to solicitor and client privilege.
Again, our view is that all of these concerns have merit but few of them
are novel or sui generis to the multi-disciplinary form of practice. As to
the first concern (pervasiveness of conflicts of interest), it is also true that
conflict of interest problems become more pervasive as law firms grow
larger in size and more diverse in the classes of specialized services that
they provide. As to the second concern (different professional traditions
with respect to conflict of interest), it is not the case that law firms are
prohibited from acting for firms in the same industry which may be actual
or potential competitors, and indeed law firms often do (albeit not in
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relation to the same matter). Obviously, lawyers should disclose potential
conflicts of interest to their clients, and clients have the prerogative of
deciding whether substantial industry-specific expertise in the matter at
hand matters more to them than the risk that they will receive less than
uncompromising fidelity to their own interests exclusively. With respect
to the third concern (divergent ethical duties), we believe that this may
present a genuine problem precisely because it engages simultaneously
both of the forms of market or contracting failure identified above (i.e.
information asymmetries and externalities). While the lawyer's overrid-
ing duty is to his or her client, the auditor has a dual duty both to his or
her client and to potentially affected third parties whose interests may be
adverse to that of the client, although. even auditors have a duty not to
disclose confidential client information without the client's consent but
rather to report material adverse information to the corporate board of
directors, who in turn may face duties of public disclosure. In the event
of non-disclosure by the board, an auditor may be required to qualify his
opinion, or at the limit withdraw from the engagement. 23 In MDPs
involving lawyers and accountants, and perhaps other MDPs that raise a
similar divergence of duty to the client and duties to third parties (e.g.
family lawyers and social workers with respect to reporting cases of child
abuse), this problem clearly requires special consideration. For example,
if an MDP acts in both capacities, rules could require advance disclosure
to clients of possible conflicts of duty and/or a waiver of duties of
confidentiality in the limited cases of a conflict of duties. Alternatively,
lawyers might be limited to becoming partners in the consulting practices
of large professional services firms, and not their accountancy practices
which are organized in Canada as separate but financially linked partner-
ships. Again, it is important not to overstate the novelty of this problem.
Lawyers not uncommonly sit on the boards of their corporate clients and
face potential conflicts of interest similar to those of auditors.
5. Unauthorized Practice
It is sometimes argued that MDPs involving lawyers may facilitate the
unauthorized practice of law by non-lawyer partners and personnel in
such firms. One strand of this concern argues that MDPs may become a
kind of regulatory "no-man's land" that fall outside the effective reach of
any of the self-regulatory professional bodies. Another strand of this
concern emphasizes that as the provision of multi-disciplinary profes-
sional services becomes more highly integrated, it will, practically
23. Written Remarks of Roger Page, Deloitte & Touche, ABA Commission on MDPs,
March 11, 1999.
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speaking, become impossible for external regulators to determine who is
doing what, thus eroding the legitimate boundaries of professional
competence. A third strand of this concern is that lawyers, particularly if
they are a minority in a multi-disciplinary firm, will have limited ability
to insist on non-lawyer partners and personnel confining themselves to
their legitimate domains of professional competence, or to exercise
effective supervision over such personnel to the extent that they are
performing functions related to the provision of legal services.
We are sceptical of the force of these concerns. With respect to the first,
it is not the case that multi-disciplinary firms will fall into some form of
regulatory no-man's-land. Each self-regulatory professional body will
continue to license and discipline its own professionals who are members
of such firms and will retain the right to take enforcement action against
non-lawyer personnel who are engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law, and against lawyer members who facilitate or assist in the unautho-
rized practice of law by non-lawyer personnel. With respect to the second
concern, while it may be the case that the closer integration of a range of
multi-disciplinary professional services within a single firm will render
professional boundaries less distinct, it is important to acknowledge that
these boundaries even now, in a wide variety of other contexts, are far
from distinct (e.g. tax advice). Moreover, it seems incongruous to argue
that bringing lawyers into multi-disciplinary firms is likely to increase
rather than reduce reliance by these firms on non-lawyer personnel in the
provision of legal services. Assuming that the boundaries that have
traditionally been recognized around the various professional domains
are approximately (albeit imprecisely) an accurate reflection of relative
specialized expertise and competence, substitution possibilities of law-
yers by non-legally trained professional personnel would seem likely to
be extremely limited. The principal efficiencies that are likely to be
engendered by MDPs (as outlined in Part I) relate to complementarities
in production and consumption that can be realized by horizontal integra-
tion, and not for the most part to substitution efficiencies. The third strand
of the concern seems equally unpersuasive. Lawyer members of MDPs,
even if they are a minority, can be held to professional obligations not to
facilitate the unauthorized practice of law. To the extent that non-lawyer
personnel are involved in some functions relating to the provision of legal
services, lawyers would also assume similar obligations of supervision or
responsibility as currently pertain with respect to para-legal personnel
and articling law students within law firms. Moreover, joint and several
liability for professional deficiencies will maintain incentives for
professionals to monitor other professionals within the firm to ensure that
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they are adhering to their respective spheres of comparative competence,
a goal that is in fact facilitated in a large multi-specialty MDP.
More generally, and more importantly, the concerns that MDPs may
facilitate the unauthorized practice of law need to be evaluated in the
market or contracting failure framework outlined above. The only pur-
pose of prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law (or any other
profession) is to protect ill-informed consumers or at-risk third-parties.
For the most part, in the present context, our principal concern is with
clients who may be led or induced by virtue of incomplete information to
purchase professional services from providers who are not competent to
supply such services. We are not concerned, it must be repeated, with
protecting professional territorial enclaves from competitive incursions
from other disciplines or innovative modes of professional organization
where these do not jeopardize clients' interests and indeed may enhance
them. For many contexts where multi-disciplinary forms of practice seem
most plausible, including especially lawyers, accountants and other
business consultants, the present and prospective clientele are likely to be
relatively sophisticated and recurrent business purchasers of professional
and other technical services (many of which are largely unregulated).
Such consumers are likely to derive minimal, if any, benefits from
vigorous and exacting monitoring of professional boundaries within
multi-disciplinary firms.
III. Regulatory Models For MDPs
1. The Status Quo
In evaluating regulatory models for MDPs it is important to recognize that
we are not starting with a tabula rasa. In a mail-out survey undertaken by
the "Futures" Task Force 4 about one-third of the roughly 8,000 private
practitioners who responded indicated that they maintained some form of
referral arrangements with other professionals, most notably with ac-
countants, but also real estate brokers, trustees in bankruptcy, financial
planners, doctors, and patent/trade mark agents. About 760 of the
respondents indicated that they maintained business arrangements with
other professionals in order to provide multi-disciplinary services to
clients. In addition, significant numbers of lawyers are employed by non-
law firms, including government departments and agencies, corpora-
tions, non-profit agencies, labour unions, and community organizations.
In areas such as personal banking and wealth management, investment
banking, and private pension services, lawyers are increasingly em-
24. Futures Report, supra note 19 at Appendix 10.
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ployed by non-law firm institutions in these fields in order to facilitate the
provision of a broader and more integrated set of professional services to
clients. In Western Europe, Australia and the U.S., the Big 5 professional
service firms already employ thousands of lawyers either in-house, for
example, in their tax practices, or in affiliated law firms performing a
broader range of functions, presumably reflecting revealed preferences
on the part of their clients. In Canada, at least one of the Big 5 professional
service firms (Ernst & Young) has set up an affiliated law firm (Donahue
Ernst & Young) that has grown to over 80 lawyers (and four offices) in
Canada since its inception in 1996.25 These trends confirm this process
of erosion of traditional exclusive professional enclaves through greater
integration of professional services.
While the Law Society of Upper Canada's "Futures" Task Force
largely rejects what it calls "the inevitability theory" of the growth of
MDPs, current professional realities decisively negate as a realistic
option complete suppression or prohibition of all such arrangements.
More importantly, the thrust of the analysis developed in the present
paper strongly suggests that consumer welfare would be enhanced by
adopting a more permissive or facilitative approach to MDPs than many
features of current professional regulation allow. Thus, in our view, little
purpose is to be served by debating regulatory options that involve more
stringent regulation of MDPs than at present or more aggressive enforce-
ment of existing restrictions, with a view to retrenching from the present
diverse range of multi-disciplinary practice arrangements. As the "Fu-
tures" Task Force itself acknowledges in relation to the option of rejection
of the MDP concept and the maintenance of the status quo, viz. the
practice of law by partnerships of lawyers only: "Support of the status quo
is a statement that improvement in the present practice model is not
possible and there is no potential for useful change. Any such conclusion
would obviously be superficial and unsupportable. '2 6 The National
Multi-Disciplinary Partnerships Committee of the Federation of Law
Societies of Canada in 1998 reported, in a similar vein, that "there is a
strong consensus of the Committee that multi-disciplinary partnerships
will happen, whether law societies choose to regulate them or not".
21
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2. MDPs Controlled By Lawyers and Providing Only Legal Services
The "Futures" Task Force considered four major options: (a) the accep-
tance, recognition and regulation of full multi-disciplinary partnerships;
(b) the acceptance of the New South Wales Model, viz. multi-disciplinary
partnerships offering multi-disciplinary services provided that the part-
nership is in the effective control of lawyers; (c) the acceptance of the
District of Columbia model, viz. multi-disciplinary partnerships offering
legal services only with no specific provisions for control; and (d) the
recognition, acceptance and regulation of multi-disciplinary partnerships
offering legal services only, provided that the partnership is in the
effective control of lawyers. The Task Force noted that the "captive" or
affiliated law firm raises distinctive regulatory issues that require inde-
pendent study and recommended that an effective vehicle be struck to
undertake this study. Subject to this caveat, the Task Force recommended
the rejection of options (a), (b), and (c) and the adoption of option (d), viz.
multi-disciplinary partnerships offering legal services only, with the
partnership in the effective control of lawyers. In the Task Force's view,
all of the concerns with respect to privilege, conflicts of interest, indepen-
dence, public duty etc., would be eliminated as the service offering would
be confined to the delivery of legal services. Furthermore, adherence to
required professional norms in the delivery of such services would be
guaranteed by the controlling influence of lawyers.28
The Task Force considered that this model presents lawyers with the
opportunity to attract para-legals into their partnerships as well as non-
legal professionals such as patent and trade mark agents, psychologists
and social workers, forensic investigators, accountants etc., but in all
cases subject to the constraint that they would be supporting the delivery
of legal services only. The Task Force considered that more permissive
options would entail unacceptable risks to clients relating to solicitor-
client privilege, legal independence, and conflict of interest. The Task
Force's recommendations were adopted by the Benchers of the Law
Society in the form of a new By-Law. 9 The By-Law defines "practice of
law" very broadly to mean the giving of any legal advice respecting
Canadian laws or the provision of legal services. MDPs between lawyers
and non-lawyers are only permitted where non-lawyers are providing
services that "support or supplement" the practice of law. In addition,
lawyers, must have "effective control" over non-lawyers' practices. This
position has become further entrenched with the Law Society of Upper
28. Futures Report, supra note 19 at 53.
29. By-Law 25 of the Law Society of Upper Canada, "Multi-Discipline Practices" adopted
by Convocation April 30, 1999.
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Canada's October 2000 adoption of the Task Force's final report which
recommends that affiliated law firms only be allowed provided that these
firms are owned and effectively controlled by lawyers. The firm with
which the law firm is affiliated may provide non-legal services, but it is
not permitted to share in the law firm's profits or revenues in any way.30
In our view, the position taken by the "Futures" Task Force is deeply
misconceived. First, restricting multi-disciplinary partnerships to the
provision of legal services is, in a fundamental sense, something of an
oxymoron. The defining characteristic of MDPs is that the services
provided do not fall within the exclusive competence of members of one
profession. The essence of the advantages from a client's perspective of
horizontal integration of professional service provision set out in Part I of
this paper is largely negated by attempting to confine MDPs to single-
disciplinary practices - an obvious contradiction in terms. Moreover,
while limiting MDPs to the provision of legal services may reduce the
dangers of conflicts of interest, loss of solicitor-client privilege or adverse
effects on the independence of legal advice, it does not provide a
guarantee of these attributes of the solicitor-client relationship. 31 For
example, information passed on by a lawyer to an accountant or trademark
agent within such a firm may not necessarily be subject to solicitor-client
privilege.
Second, with respect to the proposed lawyer in control requirement,
while it may mitigate some of the concerns about preserving the ethical
standards of the legal profession, it does not solve them. Even if they
control a firm, lawyers may not supervise non-lawyer partners as if they
were employees. Moreover, non-lawyers remain outside the direct con-
trol of legal regulators. More importantly, even aside from enforcement
issues, a control requirement does not respond to most of the ethical and
practical problems concerning conflicts of interest, solicitation, advertis-
ing, steering, insurance and compensation, assessment of bills, or the loss
of solicitor-client privilege, that can arise with non-lawyer partners, even
when lawyers constitute a majority of the partners. 32 Practically speak-
ing, a lawyer in control requirement, coupled with the requirement that
MDPs offer only legal services, almost certainly means that very few
organizations will form multi-disciplinary partnerships, as exemplified
by the experience in the District of Columbia and, to a lesser extent, the
state of New South Wales in Australia. The proposed lawyer in control
30. Law Society of Upper Canada, Multi-Disciplinary Practice Task Force, Report to
Convocation (21 September 2000).
31. "Multi-Disciplinary Practices (2000)", supra note 2 at 76.
32. Ibid. at 75.
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requirement, like the proposed mirror image accountant in control
requirement proposed by the Canadian Chartered Accountants' Inter-
Provincial Task Force, raises the unedifying prospect of a zero-sum turf
war between the accounting and legal professions that is likely to deprive
many consumers of professional services of most of the advantages of
multi-disciplinary service provision. While the Law Society's "Futures"
Task Force purports to accord great weight to the ethical objections and
concerns relating to MDPs, as earlier indicated we believe that in most
respects these objections and concerns have been overstated, and in fact
will only be marginally mitigated by adoption of the restrictions proposed
by the Task Force.
As Roach and Iacobucci conclude: "We would not require lawyers to
control MDPs and we would not restrict MDPs to the provision of legal
services. Such blunt and restrictive regulatory requirements do not target
specific mischiefs precisely enough, and moreover are doomed to irrel-
evance given the availability of exit options" (which include affiliated
law firms).33 The International Practice of Law Committee of the CBA
in their August 1999 report recommended that there be no requirement of
control of MDPs by lawyers and that their services not be restricted to
legal services (although the Committee has now resiled from this position
and taken a position similar to that of the LSUC Task Force).34 We note
also that the recent ABA Commission Report on MDPs rejected both of
these restrictions as inconsistent with the potential client benefits from
utilizing MDPs and with client choice.35
In short, the only constructive way forward, viewing consumers', not
providers', concerns as paramount, entails abandoning both of these
requirements (i.e. that MDPs should be restricted to providing only legal
services, and that these practices should be controlled by lawyers). This
conclusion enables us to consider a number of much more constructive
options.
3. The Affiliated Law Firm
To begin, at a minimum, affiliated law firms associated with broader
groups of professional service providers should be both permitted and
encouraged. Organizationally discrete affiliated law firms may reduce
the problems associated with confidentiality and loss of solicitor-client
privilege, and reduce client confusion about when they enjoy the at-
tributes of a solicitor-client relationship in their dealings with various
33. Ibid. at 79, 80.
34. The Lawyers Weekly (2 March 2001).
35. ABA delegates rejected the Commission's recommendations and voted to support the
current ban on fee-sharing with non-lawyers.
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elements of the larger professional group. Affiliated law firms might also
help contain conflict of interest problems and minimize the situations
where lawyers and other professionals will have competing duties.
However, there are still risks of conflicts of interest within the broader
professional group of which the affiliated law firm is part; risks of
disclosures of information to non-lawyer professionals entailing loss of
solicitor-client privilege, and problems of steering. However, as we have
argued above, these problems are inherent in the complexity of clients'
professional needs that require multi-disciplinary solutions and are not
peculiar to any particular professional organizational modality. In this
respect, an ineluctable trade-off must be faced. The more an affiliated law
firm is hermetically sealed-off from the larger professional group of
which it is a part, the greater the sacrifice in integration efficiencies
described earlier in this paper. If effective and efficient multi-disciplinary
service provision in many contexts requires a highly coordinated or
integrated teamwork approach, it would be fanciful to suppose that the
various ethical and related objections and concerns regarding MDPs can
be entirely eliminated through an affiliated law firm structure.
Indeed, in order to enhance integration efficiencies, we would argue
that several restrictive professional rules currently in place in the legal
profession in Ontario and elsewhere should be relaxed. First, in order to
minimize information asymmetries between service providers and cli-
ents, the affiliation between the law firm and the larger professional group
of which it is a part should be clearly and publicly signified. In our view,
this calls for allowing such a law firm to adopt a firm or brand name that
clearly signifies the affiliation (as is the case in a number of Western
European and Australian jurisdictions). This signals to consumers and
potential consumers of professional services not only the potential
advantages of fuller professional service integration but also some of the
risks (the two sides of the ledger reviewed in Parts I and II of this paper).
Second, current restrictions on advertising and solicitation, which in our
view are anti-competitive, should be substantially relaxed so that MDPs
have the ability to promote this form of organizational innovation to
prospective clients, including existing clients of other service providers.
There is little point to recognizing the potential advantages of this form
of service provision to many clients. while at the same time denying firms
the ability to communicate these advantages to such clients. Third, the
current rules on fee-splitting or revenue sharing in the context of MDPs
involving lawyers should be abandoned. Appropriate incentives for fuller
professional service integration are only created with some appropriate
form of revenue pooling and sharing. While this is often said to raise the
risk of "steering," we have argued above that this risk is already pervasive
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in many large firms within existing professions, including the legal
profession, and moreover with more sophisticated purchasers of profes-
sional services is unlikely to prove a serious problem.
The counterpart problem raised by the prohibition on revenue pooling
or sharing is client "hoarding" rather than "steering", where professionals
are reluctant to enlist the assistance of other professionals in servicing the
needs of the client because they derive no direct pecuniary benefits from
this and may be tempted to overreach their own professional competence
in order to preserve all the economic benefits from the professional
relationship in question for themselves. The experience with law firms
which have formed loose affiliations with other law firms in other
geographic centres, typically on some form of mutual referral basis, is
instructive in this respect. These arrangements have in general been much
less successful in yielding economic efficiencies from fuller professional
integration than more unified ownership structures. Currently, where
affiliated law firms are associated with larger professional groups, such
as large accounting/consulting firms, typically a wide range of costs are
shared including office space, support services, information technology,
and professional development. Presumably, these costs are shared on
some basis that reflects the relevant size and revenue contributions of the
constituent elements of the professional groups, but once one accepts that
cost sharing on a revenue-related basis is appropriate, it is largely a
semantic step then to recognize the advantages of a broader and more
complete sharing of costs and revenues.
The Law Society of Upper Canada's Multi-Disciplinary Task Force in
its recent 2000 report3 6 has recommended that affiliated law firms should
be permitted, but subject to stringent conditions that include (inter alia):
1. Affiliated law firms must be owned and effectively controlled by
lawyers;
2. The non-lawyer firm should not be permitted to share in the law
firm's profits or revenues either directly or indirectly through
excessive inter-firm charges that do not reflect fair market value;
3. An affiliated law firm should be required to establish a system for
conflicts as if both firms were one, applying to conflict situations
the obligations applicable to law firms;
4. The affiliated law firm should be required to carry on its practice
entirely within its own separate premises and maintain its docu-
ments, records, and files, including all electronic data, entirely
separate and apart from the files, documents, records and elec-
tronic data of the affiliated firm; and,
36. Supra note 30.
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5. An affiliated law firm should be required to observe the current
rules on firm names (requiring firm names to include only names
of present or deceased partners) in order to ensure that the public
is not misled into believing that non-lawyers are practising or
entitled to practice law.
For reasons given above, we believe that these rules are much too
restrictive and will entail the sacrifice of most integration efficiencies,
thus severely discouraging the formation of affiliated law firms.
4. Fully Integrated MDPs
If one accepts the logic of our argument to this juncture, first against
restricting MDPs to the provision only of legal services and then only if
under the control of lawyers and second in favour of affiliated law firms
with high degrees of identification and integration with the larger
professional groups of which they are a part, then the question must
necessarily be faced of whether any useful purpose is served by insisting
on this degree of organizational discreteness. The ABA Commission
took the view that affiliated law firms with fee-sharing and fully inte-
grated MDPs are functionally similar. In other words, what is gained or
lost by then permitting complete integration of lawyers within larger
professional multi-disciplinary service firms (i.e. the full blown multi-
disciplinary partnership)? The gains, at least conceptually, are easily
identified. First, one ceases engaging in largely semantic charades - of
confounding form with substance - which has the virtue of forthrightness
and intellectual honesty. Second, as a matter of principle, integration
efficiencies are likely to be maximized when the most complete forms of
professional integration are permitted. Third, joint and several liability
across the partners in an MDP is likely in fact to enhance incentives for
monitoring adherence by professionals to their respective spheres of
comparative advantage. With respect to the losses or risks to consumers
from integration, it may be arguable that, relative to the affiliated law
firm, effective regulatory oversight by the governing bodies of the legal
profession is rendered somewhat more difficult with more diffuse and
pervasive professional interactions to monitor. Arguably again, solicitor-
client privilege problems, confidentiality problems, conflicts of interest
problems, and independence problems are rendered marginally more
acute in a multi-disciplinary partnership relative to an affiliated law firm,
but, as we have emphasized before, this is the inherent trade-off between
the advantages of fuller service integration and some of the disadvan-
tages. This is a calculus that in the end only clients, given their own
particular circumstances, are able to make.
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We believe that there are several regulatory options that should be
explored that would maximize the advantages to clients of professional
service provision by MDPs, while minimizing their disadvantages.
a. Individual Licensing
The first is continued individual licensing of professionals by each self-
governing profession as at present, but with removal of restrictions that
especially impede the formation of MDPs, such as prohibitions on fee-
splitting, prohibitions on use of firm or brand names, and restrictions on
advertising and solicitation. Prohibitions on individual unauthorized
practice would continue, and licensed professionals would be prohibited
from facilitating or assisting in the unauthorized practice of law. Existing
rules could be amplified to ensure that only lawyers have access to
lawyers' trust funds and that compensation for defalcations only applies
to defalcations by lawyers. Rules could also clarify that mandatory
lawyers' indemnity insurance is only available with respect to legal
services rendered by lawyers. The taxation of bills for legal services could
be preserved by requiring that legal services be separately itemized on
accounts rendered by MDPs. Issues relating to solicitor and client
privilege, confidentiality, and conflicts of interest as they arise in an MDP
context should attract a presumption that few special rules are required,
recognizing that most of these concerns may arise in a wide range of other
organizational contexts and are inherent in clients' problems that require
multi-disciplinary solutions rather than in the organizational modality
deployed to provide solutions.
This option is the least intrusive, least bureaucratic, and most flexible
approach to MDPs and will provide maximum latitude for the evolution
of organizational modalities in the provision of professional services in
the future and hence least constrain dynamic efficiency. However, it does
not, in itself, resolve potential conflicts in regulatory or ethical require-
ments imposed by different professions.
b. Firm Certification
Another proposal initially advanced by John Quinn in a background
paper for the Professional Organizations Committee in 1979 (adapted
from the Certificate of Authorization regime maintained for engineering
firms by the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario) and
endorsed by the Research Directorate (of which Trebilcock was a
member) of the Professional Organizations Committee and again en-
dorsed recently by Roach and Iacobucci 3 7 contemplates a form of firm
37. "Multi-Disciplinary Practices (2000)", supra note 2.
Multi-Disciplinary Professional Practices: A Consumer Welfare Perspective 33
licensing for MDPs, in addition to existing forms of individual licensing.
The ABA Commission on MDPs adopts a variant of this regime, while
the International Practice of Law Committee of the CBA recommends
that MDPs should not be required to obtain a firm licence but notes that
circumstances may evolve which may require licensing of certain types
of MDPs. A condition for the issuance of a Certificate of Authorization
to a firm comprising members of more than one profession would be the
firm's commitment to adhere to certain basic ethical requirements. Some
of these requirements may involve a form of mandatory disclosure to
clients and waivers with respect to aspects of solicitor-client privilege and
confidentiality. Other issues might pertain to rationalized conflict of
interest rules, directorships or investments in clients subject to audit (a
rule now maintained by the accounting profession), and the prohibition
of audit assignments and legal assignments for the same clients (to
resolve the client/third-party potential conflict), or alternatively a rule
providing for waiver of solicitor-client privilege and confidentiality
obligations in this case. Other rules would need to be adopted with respect
to management of and access to lawyers' trust funds and limiting
exposure of mandatory lawyers' indemnity insurance to claims arising
out of actions by non-lawyer partners or personnel. These examples are
merely illustrative of how such an approach to the potential advantages
and disadvantages of multi-disciplinary practice might be elaborated.
Regulatory overreach would be discouraged by the fact that firms would
possess a number of exit options, including the affiliated law firm option,
which would be simultaneously available. The advantage of firm licens-
ing over individual licensing is that it creates a collective rather than
individual stake in ensuring compliance by all personnel within a firm
with applicable rules and thus may provide more effective incentives to
this end. However, the firm licensing approach is somewhat more
bureaucratic than the individual licensing approach in that additional
layers of licensing are entailed, especially if certificates must be obtained
from each of the professional bodies of all participating professionals. It
also does not, in itself, resolve potential conflicts in regulatory or ethical
requirements imposed by different professions.
The ABA Commission's proposals exemplify these difficulties. Cer-
tification of an MDP by the court (or in Canada the governing body of the
legal profession) would only be required where the MDP is not controlled
by lawyers. For MDPs controlled by lawyers, only individual licensing
would be required. It seems incongruous in many respects that the
regulatory authority of the legal profession over an MDP as a firm
increases as the number of lawyers participating in such a firm decreases.
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By parity of reasoning, it would seem to follow that in the case of MDPs
controlled by lawyers with a minority of accountants, the accounting
profession should be able to insist on a firm-level certification regime
whereby the lawyers are required to comply with the accounting
profession's regulatory requirements. However, if conditions for certifi-
cation differ between the two professions, little will have been accom-
plished except additional layers of cumbersome and potentially dysfunc-
tional professional regulation. These problems will increase exponentially
if more than two professions are involved (which may often be the case)
and if firms seek to operate in more than one jurisdiction.
c. Inter-professional Coordination Committees
These problems suggest the strong desirability of an inter-professional
coordinated or joint approach to setting any special conditions for the
issuance of individual or firm licenses in an MDP context. More con-
cretely, we propose that where MDPs involving members of more than
one self-regulating profession are proposed, a committee be struck
comprising representatives of each of the professions involved, together
with demand-side interests to be appointed by government (perhaps
committees of about nine members, three from each profession and three
from demand-side interests with the committee to be chaired by one of the
latter, and with decisions to be made by a two-thirds vote). The mandate
of such a committee would be to resolve potential regulatory conflicts
between the two professions in an MDP context in ways that best serve
consumer interests and to recommend appropriate rule changes to the
professions with respect to participation by their members in MDPs. In
the event of the governing bodies of the professions failing to adopt a
committee's recommendations, the government to whom they account
would need to contemplate legislative or regulatory intervention. Such
committees would need to be struck for each particular combination or
configuration of professions in an MDP to ensure relevant expertise and
to avoid a bureaucratic imbroglio which a large, single multi-stakeholder
inter-professional committee may entail. Once a particular committee
resolves points of potential regulatory conflict between two or more
professions whose members are proposing an MDP, it would befunctus.
Each committee would be given a tight timeframe for decision-making
(e.g. six months from its constitution). In the event of an inability to reach
decisions, a new committee would be struck. Once appropriate rule
changes are in place, each profession would continue to licence and
supervise its individual members as at present; firm certification or
licensing would be unnecessary. Under this proposal, no one profession
could assert supremacy in setting the conditions under which MDPs
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involving its members and members of other professions will be permit-
ted - clearly an invitation to a counter-productive turf war in which the
consumer interest is in danger of disappearing from view. Some refine-
ments to this proposal will be required in the case of proposed MDPs
between regulated and unregulated professionals. To the extent that the
professional regulations of the regulated profession require modification
to accommodate such arrangements, in some cases professional associa-
tions of the unregulated professionals may be sufficiently inclusive to
appoint representatives of their interests to an inter-professional coordi-
nating committee. In other cases, where such bodies are lacking, govern-
ment may need to appoint representatives of both demand-side interests
and the unregulated profession.
Unlike the CBA's committee on MDPs, which recommends that the
CBA and the law societies address specific regulatory issues regarding
lawyers' participation in MDPs, the creation of inter-professional coor-
dination committees recognizes the interplay among professionals that
MDPs necessarily entail. MDP regulation cannot be effectively devel-
oped and implemented absent the participation of representatives of all
the professions which the MDP involves.
Conclusion
In contrast to the sweeping and in many respects crude prophylactic
approach that has hitherto been adopted by both the legal and accounting
professions and that remains reflected in the recent proposals by the Law
Society of Upper Canada and the Inter-Provincial Chartered Accounting
Task Force, approaches along the lines that we have sketched would
come to terms with both professional realities as they stand today and
accelerating trends towards the internationalization and integration of
professional service markets (as with many other markets). These ap-
proaches would move debates over the future role of MDPs beyond the
domain of the unedifying professional turf wars that have come to
dominate such debates and toward a co-operative rather than competitive
focus on the only question that ought to dominate these debates: What do
informed consumers of professional services want, and to the extent that
there are currently grounds for concern that information asymmetries or
externalities may distort such choices, what steps can the various profes-
sions involved take, through their governing bodies and inter-profes-
sional co-operative mechanisms, to enhance informed choice and resolve
externalities? In the end, as a matter of principle, how consumers
purchase professional services should be their decision, not a decision
taken for them by the professions or their professional bodies, whose
paramount duty is to serve their clients' diverse interests as effectively as
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possible. To date, inter-professional rivalry and the skirmishes that it has
generated have prevented any serious focus on the possible form of inter-
professional cooperative mechanisms and on a targeted agenda of sub-
stantive issues requiring resolution through these mechanisms if MDPs
are to be facilitated in ways that enhance consumer welfare (and coinci-
dentally, the productivity and incomes of participating professionals).
But unlocking the present inter-professional impasse demands that the
hard work entailed in a constructive approach to the design of the details
of a cooperative rather than competitive approach to these issues be
accorded a central and immediate priority.
